rgs.mef.gov.it
Rgs.mef.gov.it is the website of the State General Accounting Office (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato), a structure of Italy's Ministry of Economy and Finance. Home-page capture: 106 requests, only 2 domains. Outwardly this is a model of restraint: there are no commercial trackers, no Google, Meta, advertising or social plugins at all, not a single cookie was set during the session, and the only external address is the Ministry of Finance's government IT company Sogei. But it is precisely its Matomo analytics that, before consent, does more than de-identified statistics: it records the view with a visitor identifier, keeps session recording and heatmaps on and tracks interaction with the consent form. This is behavioural observation requiring consent, whereas the policy calls the collection «anonymous». The data, meanwhile, does not go to commercial third parties — everything stays within the government infrastructure, so the case is mild, but there is a violation in essence.
Request timeline
Declared versus actual
Detected trackers
- Matomo on Sogei's infrastructure
- Session Recording / Heatmap (Matomo)
- Form Analytics (Matomo)
Indicators of GDPR non-compliance
- Art. 6(1)(a) GDPR — behavioural analytics and session recording start before consentThe site has its own consent banner (a Sogei module), but the Matomo analytics on Sogei's infrastructure fires before any user decision. Already at 0.4 seconds a page view is recorded with a visitor identifier (rather than as a de-identified aggregate), at 0.5 seconds the session-recording and heatmap plugin (Heatmap & Session Recording) initialises, and later form analytics records interaction with the consent form itself. Session recording and heatmaps are behavioural, individual observation of the user rather than aggregate statistics, and by Garante's rules they require prior consent. Here, however, these tools deploy before the user made a choice. Importantly: everything stays on Sogei's government infrastructure (the Ministry of Finance's IT company), there are no commercial recipients and no transfer to advertising third parties — that is, this is not a leak outward, but a redundancy of the own analytics before consent.
- Art. 13 GDPR — the declared «de-identified statistics» does not match the actual behaviour recordingThe policy describes the analytics collection as processing of statistics «in forma anonima» — in de-identified form. However, in fact Matomo assigns a visitor identifier and keeps the session-recording, heatmap and form-analytics plugins on — that is, it conducts individual behavioural observation, which is not de-identified aggregate statistics. Neither the session recording, nor the heatmaps, nor the form analytics is named in the policy. Thus the document understates what is actually collected: the user is promised anonymous statistics, while the toolkit is configured for behavioural tracking.
Context
www.rgs.mef.gov.it is the website of Italy’s State General Accounting Office (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato), a division of the Ministry of Economy and Finance responsible for the state budget and accounting. The data controller is a structure of the MEF; the technical operator is the government IT company Sogei S.p.A. The site is informational-documentary: budget documents, regulations, reporting. Capture: 106 requests to only 2 domains, the home page, taken on a clean Edge browser with no VPN and no blocker. Of the two domains, one is its own, the second is analytics on Sogei’s infrastructure. No commercial trackers, no Google, advertising or social plugins.
Who receives the data
Spotted here was: Sogei — the government IT company of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. This is the key feature of the case: the data does not go to commercial third parties. The analytics is deployed on Sogei’s infrastructure, that is, it stays within the government IT perimeter. There is no Google Analytics, no advertising networks, no social-network pixels, no third-party exchanges in the capture. Not a single cookie was set.
Was there a consent banner
Yes, the site has its own consent-banner module (developed by Sogei), it loads at the 82nd millisecond. But in a clean session it is visible that the analytics does not wait for it: the behavioural tools start before any user decision.
What fires before consent
Despite the presence of a banner, before the user’s choice the following manage to fire:
- the recording of the page view with the assignment of a visitor identifier (not a de-identified aggregate);
- the initialisation of session recording and heatmaps (Heatmap & Session Recording);
- form analytics recording the interaction with the consent form. The difference is fundamental. De-identified aggregate statistics can, by Garante’s rules, work without consent. But session recording and heatmaps are individual behavioural observation (movements, clicks, scrolling), and the assignment of a visitor identifier links the requests within a visit. Such a toolkit requires prior consent — while here it deploys before it.
«Anonymous» declared — behavioural observation in fact
A separate mismatch — between the policy and the fact. The document describes the analytics collection as processing of statistics «in de-identified form». But in fact session recording, heatmaps and form analytics are on, and the view is recorded with a visitor identifier — this is not anonymous aggregate statistics. None of these behavioural tools is named in the policy. That is, the user is promised anonymous statistics, while individual behaviour tracking is configured.
Conclusion
Rgs.mef.gov.it is an instructive intermediate case. On the one hand, in terms of the hygiene of external connections it is a model: no commercial trackers, no Google, no advertising, no social plugins, no cookies; the only address is the government IT company Sogei, and the data does not leave the government perimeter. On the other — the own analytics on this infrastructure does more than promised before consent: it records the view with a visitor identifier, deploys session recording and heatmaps and tracks behaviour on the consent form, although the policy calls the collection anonymous. The main takeaway for the reader: «one’s own server» and the absence of third-party recipients is good, but not an indulgence. Behavioural session recording requires consent regardless of whose infrastructure serves it, and the document should honestly name what it collects. It would be enough to defer these tools until consent and bring the policy into line with the fact.
How to verify: download the file and compute its checksum — sha256sum file.har (Linux, macOS) or certutil -hashfile file.har SHA256 (Windows); it must match the one shown. The conclusions apply to the scope of this measurement — see the limitations of the method.
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Тема: Запрос доступа к персональным данным (ст. 15 GDPR) — rgs.mef.gov.it Кому: [укажите адрес компании — DPO / поддержка / юридический отдел] От: [Ваше имя], [контактный email] Прошу предоставить доступ к моим персональным данным, обрабатываемым в связи с использованием сайта rgs.mef.gov.it. 1. Категории данных и цели обработки (ст. 15(1)(a)-(c)) На основании независимого технического анализа сайта прошу подтвердить и подробно раскрыть следующие категории обработки: 1) На сайте есть собственный баннер согласия (модуль Sogei), но аналитика Matomo на инфраструктуре Sogei отрабатывает раньше любого решения пользователя. Уже на 0,4 секунды записывается просмотр страницы с идентификатором посетителя (а не как обезличенный агрегат), на 0,5 секунды инициализируется плагин записи сессий и тепловых карт (Heatmap & Session Recording), а позже форм-аналитика фиксирует взаимодействие с самой формой согласия. Запись сессий и тепловые карты — это поведенческое, индивидуальное наблюдение за пользователем, а не агрегированная статистика, и по правилам Garante оно требует предварительного согласия. Здесь же эти инструменты разворачиваются до того, как пользователь сделал выбор. Важно: всё остаётся на государственной инфраструктуре Sogei (ИТ-компания Минфина), коммерческих получателей и передачи к рекламным третьим сторонам нет — то есть это не утечка вовне, а избыточность собственной аналитики до согласия. 2) Политика описывает аналитический сбор как обработку статистики «in forma anonima» — в обезличенной форме. Однако фактически Matomo присваивает идентификатор посетителя и держит включёнными плагины записи сессий, тепловых карт и форм-аналитики — то есть ведёт индивидуальное поведенческое наблюдение, которое обезличенной агрегатной статистикой не является. Ни запись сессий, ни тепловые карты, ни форм-аналитика в политике не названы. Таким образом документ занижает то, что реально собирается: пользователю обещают анонимную статистику, а инструментарий настроен на поведенческое отслеживание. 2. Получатели, сроки хранения и передача за пределы ЕЭЗ (ст. 15(1)(c)-(d), 46) Прошу также указать полный список третьих лиц-получателей, применимые сроки хранения по каждой категории и правовые основания передачи данных за пределы ЕЭЗ, если таковая происходит. Полный технический разбор с доказательствами (сохранённый сетевой журнал, контрольная сумма SHA-256) опубликован по адресу: https://gdpru.eu/en/audits/it-rgs-mef-gov-it/ 3. Автоматизированная обработка и профилирование (ст. 15(1)(h)) Прошу сообщить, применяется ли в отношении меня автоматизированное принятие решений или профилирование, и если да — раскрыть логику такой обработки. С уважением, [Ваше имя] [контактный email] [Страна] [Дата]
Subject: Data access request (GDPR Art. 15) — rgs.mef.gov.it To: [insert the company's address — DPO / support / legal department] From: [Your name], [contact email] I request access to my personal data processed in connection with the website rgs.mef.gov.it. 1. Categories of data and purposes of processing (Art. 15(1)(a)-(c)) Based on an independent technical analysis of the site, I request confirmation and detailed disclosure of the following categories of processing: 1) The site has its own consent banner (a Sogei module), but the Matomo analytics on Sogei's infrastructure fires before any user decision. Already at 0.4 seconds a page view is recorded with a visitor identifier (rather than as a de-identified aggregate), at 0.5 seconds the session-recording and heatmap plugin (Heatmap & Session Recording) initialises, and later form analytics records interaction with the consent form itself. Session recording and heatmaps are behavioural, individual observation of the user rather than aggregate statistics, and by Garante's rules they require prior consent. Here, however, these tools deploy before the user made a choice. Importantly: everything stays on Sogei's government infrastructure (the Ministry of Finance's IT company), there are no commercial recipients and no transfer to advertising third parties — that is, this is not a leak outward, but a redundancy of the own analytics before consent. 2) The policy describes the analytics collection as processing of statistics «in forma anonima» — in de-identified form. However, in fact Matomo assigns a visitor identifier and keeps the session-recording, heatmap and form-analytics plugins on — that is, it conducts individual behavioural observation, which is not de-identified aggregate statistics. Neither the session recording, nor the heatmaps, nor the form analytics is named in the policy. Thus the document understates what is actually collected: the user is promised anonymous statistics, while the toolkit is configured for behavioural tracking. 2. Recipients, retention periods, and transfers outside the EEA (Art. 15(1)(c)-(d), 46) I also request the full list of third-party recipients, the applicable retention period for each category, and the legal basis for any transfer of data outside the EEA. The full technical audit with evidence (saved network log, SHA-256 checksum) is published at: https://gdpru.eu/en/audits/it-rgs-mef-gov-it/ 3. Automated processing and profiling (Art. 15(1)(h)) Please state whether I am subject to automated decision-making or profiling, and if so, disclose the logic involved. Sincerely, [Your name] [contact email] [Country] [Date]
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Where to file: Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante) — garanteprivacy.it
The regulator reviews complaints in its national language. There is an officially translated template from the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) — you can use it instead of or alongside this letter: Official EDPB complaint form (PDF, your language)
Тема: Жалоба на обработку персональных данных — rgs.mef.gov.it 1. Предмет жалобы Я подаю жалобу в отношении обработки моих персональных данных сайтом rgs.mef.gov.it. 2. Обстоятельства Я посетил сайт rgs.mef.gov.it и обнаружил признаки несоответствия обработки моих персональных данных требованиям GDPR. Технический разбор, опубликованный на gdpru.eu 15.06.2026 (открытая методология, воспроизводимые измерения), документирует следующие признаки: 1) На сайте есть собственный баннер согласия (модуль Sogei), но аналитика Matomo на инфраструктуре Sogei отрабатывает раньше любого решения пользователя. Уже на 0,4 секунды записывается просмотр страницы с идентификатором посетителя (а не как обезличенный агрегат), на 0,5 секунды инициализируется плагин записи сессий и тепловых карт (Heatmap & Session Recording), а позже форм-аналитика фиксирует взаимодействие с самой формой согласия. Запись сессий и тепловые карты — это поведенческое, индивидуальное наблюдение за пользователем, а не агрегированная статистика, и по правилам Garante оно требует предварительного согласия. Здесь же эти инструменты разворачиваются до того, как пользователь сделал выбор. Важно: всё остаётся на государственной инфраструктуре Sogei (ИТ-компания Минфина), коммерческих получателей и передачи к рекламным третьим сторонам нет — то есть это не утечка вовне, а избыточность собственной аналитики до согласия. 2) Политика описывает аналитический сбор как обработку статистики «in forma anonima» — в обезличенной форме. Однако фактически Matomo присваивает идентификатор посетителя и держит включёнными плагины записи сессий, тепловых карт и форм-аналитики — то есть ведёт индивидуальное поведенческое наблюдение, которое обезличенной агрегатной статистикой не является. Ни запись сессий, ни тепловые карты, ни форм-аналитика в политике не названы. Таким образом документ занижает то, что реально собирается: пользователю обещают анонимную статистику, а инструментарий настроен на поведенческое отслеживание. Полная техническая документация опубликована по адресу: https://gdpru.eu/en/audits/it-rgs-mef-gov-it/ 3. Положения GDPR, соблюдение которых прошу проверить Art. 6(1)(a) GDPR — поведенческая аналитика и запись сессий стартуют до согласия; Art. 13 GDPR — заявленная «обезличенная статистика» не соответствует фактической записи поведения 4. Требование Прошу проверить изложенные обстоятельства и, если несоответствие подтвердится, принять меры, предусмотренные статьёй 58(2) GDPR. 5. Приложения Полная доказательная база — HAR-файл, контрольная сумма SHA-256 и цитата из политики конфиденциальности сайта, документирующая указанное противоречие — опубликована и проверяема по ссылке в пункте 2 выше. С уважением, [Ваше имя] [контактный email] [Страна] [Дата]
Subject: Complaint regarding personal data processing — rgs.mef.gov.it 1. Subject of the complaint I am filing a complaint regarding the processing of my personal data by the website rgs.mef.gov.it. 2. Circumstances I visited the website rgs.mef.gov.it and found indications that the processing of my personal data does not comply with the GDPR. The technical analysis published on gdpru.eu on 15 June 2026 (open methodology, reproducible measurements) documents the following indications: 1) The site has its own consent banner (a Sogei module), but the Matomo analytics on Sogei's infrastructure fires before any user decision. Already at 0.4 seconds a page view is recorded with a visitor identifier (rather than as a de-identified aggregate), at 0.5 seconds the session-recording and heatmap plugin (Heatmap & Session Recording) initialises, and later form analytics records interaction with the consent form itself. Session recording and heatmaps are behavioural, individual observation of the user rather than aggregate statistics, and by Garante's rules they require prior consent. Here, however, these tools deploy before the user made a choice. Importantly: everything stays on Sogei's government infrastructure (the Ministry of Finance's IT company), there are no commercial recipients and no transfer to advertising third parties — that is, this is not a leak outward, but a redundancy of the own analytics before consent. 2) The policy describes the analytics collection as processing of statistics «in forma anonima» — in de-identified form. However, in fact Matomo assigns a visitor identifier and keeps the session-recording, heatmap and form-analytics plugins on — that is, it conducts individual behavioural observation, which is not de-identified aggregate statistics. Neither the session recording, nor the heatmaps, nor the form analytics is named in the policy. Thus the document understates what is actually collected: the user is promised anonymous statistics, while the toolkit is configured for behavioural tracking. Full technical documentation is published at: https://gdpru.eu/en/audits/it-rgs-mef-gov-it/ 3. GDPR provisions I ask you to examine Art. 6(1)(a) GDPR — behavioural analytics and session recording start before consent; Art. 13 GDPR — the declared «de-identified statistics» does not match the actual behaviour recording 4. Request I request that you examine the circumstances described and, if non-compliance is confirmed, apply the measures provided for in Article 58(2) GDPR. 5. Attachments The full evidence base — the HAR file, its SHA-256 checksum and the quotation from the site's privacy policy documenting the stated contradiction — is published and verifiable at the link in point 2 above. Sincerely, [Your name] [contact email] [Country] [Date]