Prenatal.com is a chain of maternity and baby-product stores. Home-page capture: 256 requests, 34 domains — a heavy advertising stack on a sensitive subject. There is a OneTrust consent-collection platform, but its consent check is recorded only at around the 25th second, while before it the whole advertising-social set already sends data. The Facebook pixel sends a view event to Meta, the TikTok pixel sends its event and enriches it by IP, Microsoft Bing and Google advertising fire, the Awin affiliate network and the Webtrekk analytics. That is, several large advertising networks at once receive data about the visit to a maternity site before consent. Meanwhile the TikTok pixel and the Webtrekk analytics are not even named in the policy.
Timeline of the leak
Declared versus actual
Detected trackers
- Facebook / Meta Pixel
- TikTok Pixel
- Bing Ads (UET)
- Google Ad Manager / AdSense
- Awin (affiliate)
- Webtrekk / Mapp
Indicators of GDPR non-compliance
- Art. 6(1)(a) GDPR — advertising and social pixels fire before consentThe site has a OneTrust consent-collection platform, but its consent check in this session is recorded very late — at around the 25th second. And before it the whole advertising-social set already sends data. The Facebook pixel sends a page-view event to Meta. The TikTok pixel sends its event and additionally reaches out to an IP-address enrichment domain. The Microsoft Bing advertising tag and Google advertising fire, the Awin affiliate network connects in the first second, and the Webtrekk analytics sends its pixel. That is, several large advertising networks at once receive data about the visit before consent. Given the site's subject matter — maternity and baby products — this is the profiling of expectant and young parents across several advertising platforms, and it happens before any user choice.
- Art. 13 GDPR — the TikTok pixel and Webtrekk analytics are not named in the policyThe policy names as some of the third-party recipients Facebook, Microsoft Bing, Google and the Awin affiliate network. However, the TikTok pixel, which sends events and reaches out to an IP-enrichment domain, is not mentioned in the policy at all. Nor is the Webtrekk analytics named. That is, data about the visit to a maternity site goes to TikTok — a large advertising platform — while the user cannot learn of it from the policy. For such sensitive subject matter, an undisclosed advertising recipient is especially weighty.
Context
www.prenatal.com is a chain of maternity and baby-product stores. The data controller is the Prénatal operator. The audience is expectant and young parents, which makes the subject matter sensitive: an interest in such products directly indicates pregnancy and the presence of small children. Capture: 256 requests to 34 domains, the home page, taken on a clean Edge browser with no VPN and no blocker. There is a OneTrust consent-collection platform. The technical stack is a heavy advertising set with the pixels of several social and advertising networks.
Who receives the data
Spotted here were: Meta, TikTok, Microsoft / Bing, Google, Awin. Meta receives a view event via the Facebook pixel. TikTok — via its pixel, with additional IP-address enrichment. Microsoft receives data via the Bing advertising tag, Google — via advertising tags, the Awin affiliate network tracks clicks. Additionally, the Webtrekk analytics works. This is several large advertising platforms at once, and on a maternity-products site each of them receives a signal about the user’s interest in this subject.
Was there a consent banner
Yes, the site has a OneTrust consent-collection platform, but its consent check in the session is recorded very late — at around the 25th second. By this moment the advertising and social pixels have already sent data. The policy itself classes the profiling cookies as requiring consent («authorisation is optional»). That is, the platform acknowledges that these pixels should wait for the choice — while they fire before it.
What fires before consent
Before consent is recorded, the following fire:
- the Facebook pixel — a view event to Meta;
- the TikTok pixel — an event and IP enrichment;
- the Microsoft Bing advertising tag;
- Google advertising tags;
- the Awin affiliate network;
- the Webtrekk analytics. Advertising and social pixels are non-technical purposes requiring consent. Here several of them at once send data tens of seconds before consent, and this is profiling on a sensitive subject.
Undisclosed recipients
A separate point. Of the actually working networks the policy names Facebook, Microsoft Bing, Google and Awin. But the TikTok pixel, which sends events and enriches them by IP, is not mentioned in the policy at all, nor is the Webtrekk analytics. That is, data about the visit to a maternity site goes to TikTok, while the user cannot learn of it from the document. For such subject matter, an undisclosed advertising recipient is especially weighty.
Conclusion
Prenatal.com is a heavy case, and the seriousness is heightened by the subject matter. On a maternity-and-baby-products site, several large advertising networks at once — Meta, TikTok, Microsoft, Google — receive data about the visit before consent, which is recorded only by the 25th second, while the TikTok pixel and the Webtrekk analytics are not even named in the policy. The main takeaway for the reader: an interest in maternity products is a sensitive signal, and its transmission to several advertising platforms before consent means that the profiling of expectant parents begins before any choice of theirs, and some of the recipients are not disclosed at all. It would be enough to switch all advertising and social pixels into consent-waiting mode and bring the list of recipients into line with the actual one — starting with TikTok.
13c0e4ff6771cc840cd545de05055386c1194ec7a6860c08918dc21b9724c13dWhere to file: Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante) — garanteprivacy.it
To: Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante) From: [Your name], [contact email] 1. Subject of the complaint I am filing a complaint regarding the processing of my personal data by the website prenatal.com. 2. Circumstances I visited the website prenatal.com and found indications that the processing of my personal data does not comply with the GDPR. The technical analysis published on gdpru.eu on 20 June 2026 (open methodology, reproducible measurements) documents the following indications: 1) The site has a OneTrust consent-collection platform, but its consent check in this session is recorded very late — at around the 25th second. And before it the whole advertising-social set already sends data. The Facebook pixel sends a page-view event to Meta. The TikTok pixel sends its event and additionally reaches out to an IP-address enrichment domain. The Microsoft Bing advertising tag and Google advertising fire, the Awin affiliate network connects in the first second, and the Webtrekk analytics sends its pixel. That is, several large advertising networks at once receive data about the visit before consent. Given the site's subject matter — maternity and baby products — this is the profiling of expectant and young parents across several advertising platforms, and it happens before any user choice. 2) The policy names as some of the third-party recipients Facebook, Microsoft Bing, Google and the Awin affiliate network. However, the TikTok pixel, which sends events and reaches out to an IP-enrichment domain, is not mentioned in the policy at all. Nor is the Webtrekk analytics named. That is, data about the visit to a maternity site goes to TikTok — a large advertising platform — while the user cannot learn of it from the policy. For such sensitive subject matter, an undisclosed advertising recipient is especially weighty. Full technical documentation is published at: https://gdpru.eu/en/audits/it-prenatal-com/ 3. Provisions violated Art. 6(1)(a) GDPR — advertising and social pixels fire before consent; Art. 13 GDPR — the TikTok pixel and Webtrekk analytics are not named in the policy 4. Request I request that you investigate the violations described and apply the measures provided for in Article 58(2) GDPR. 5. Attachments The full evidence base — the HAR file, its SHA-256 checksum and the quotation from the site's privacy policy documenting the stated contradiction — is published and verifiable at the link in point 2 above. [Date] [Signature / name]