Technical audit · 13.09.2026

cookie-script.com

A consent management platform's site

The site of the CookieScript consent management platform — a single capture of a blog page, 93 requests, 16 nodes. What is notable is that this is the site of the CMP's own developer (Objectis, UAB), with its own product installed on it. Google analytics and advertising respect the denial — GA4 and Google Ads carry status gcs=G100, cookieless. But two advertising pixels actually send events around the in-house consent mechanism: the Facebook pixel sends /tr, and LinkedIn Ads sends wa/ and collect. Both do not know consent mode. And LinkedIn is not named in the policy by name, although Google, Meta and Customerly are named.

Request timeline

+668…+1265 ms · container before the in-house CMP
www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js (+668 ms) — before the in-house CookieScript (cdn.cookie-script.com, +1265 ms). The tag manager initialises before the same vendor's consent platform.
+1273…+1712 ms · advertising pixels send events
connect.facebook.net/fbevents.js (+1273 ms), signals/config/241710402319437 (+1396 ms), www.facebook.com/tr POST (+1478 ms — event sent); snap.licdn.com/insight.min.js (+1276 ms), px.ads.linkedin.com/wa/ POST and /collect (+1692…+1712 ms — LinkedIn Ads sends). GA4 and Google Ads — gcs=G100, cookieless.
+5119…+5241 ms · Customerly
chat.customerly.io/v3/ping and v3/analytics/collect — the Customerly chat/CRM sends analytics.

Declared versus actual

✓ Controller — Objectis, UAB (reg. 304037472, Laisves 60, Vilnius, Lithuania) — the developer of CookieScript — declared
✓ The policy names recipients: Google, Meta, Stripe, Customerly — declared
✓ Legal basis for advertising — consent — declared
✓ Consent management — the in-house product CookieScript — declared
✓ Supervisory authority — Lithuanian (VDAI) — declared
+ The LinkedIn Ads advertising pixel (actively sends wa/, collect) is not named in the policy by name — not declared
+ The Facebook and LinkedIn Ads pixels send events around the in-house consent mechanism — not declared
+ The GTM container loads before the in-house CMP — not declared

Transfer timings

+668 ms www.googletagmanager.com

GTM before the cookie-script.com CMP (+1265 ms).

+1478 ms www.facebook.com

/tr POST, id 241710402319437; content in the body (redacted).

+1692 ms px.ads.linkedin.com

wa/ (POST) and collect; not named in the policy.

+1340 ms region1.google-analytics.com

GA4 page_view, gcs=G100.

Detected trackers

Indicators of GDPR non-compliance

Context

cookie-script.com is the site of the CookieScript consent management platform. The controller is Objectis, UAB (reg. code 304037472, Laisves str. 60, Vilnius, Lithuania) — that is, the developer of the product itself. What is notable about the case is that this is the site of the vendor of the consent mechanism, with its own product installed on it. The processing is described by a privacy policy.

The capture is a single recording of a blog page (/blog/cookieinformation-alternative-cookiescript): 93 requests, 16 nodes.

Who data goes to directly

The Facebook and LinkedIn Ads advertising pixels (both actually send events). Google Analytics and Google Ads (under denial, gcs=G100, cookieless). The in-house CookieScript CMP. The Customerly chat/CRM. Functionally — fonts. The requests to edge.microsoft.com/translate are a capture-tool artefact (translation in the browser).

Declared versus actual

The discrepancy here is all the more noticeable because this is the site of the maker of the consent mechanism itself.

Google analytics respect the denial. The GA4 events (page_view, scroll) and Google Ads (ccm/collect) carry status gcs=G100 — both storages denied, cookieless. This is correct behaviour when consent has not been given.

But the Facebook and LinkedIn advertising pixels send events. The Facebook pixel (id 241710402319437) sends a /tr POST at +1478 ms — the event was actually sent (the content is in the request body, redacted during cleaning, so the specifics cannot be read). The LinkedIn Ads pixel sends px.ads.linkedin.com/wa/ (POST) and /collect at +1692…+1712 ms. Both pixels do not know Google’s consent mode and operate independently of it; the in-house CookieScript CMP (cdn.cookie-script.com) loads at +1265 ms, and the GTM container earlier, at +668 ms. That is, on the site of the consent-platform vendor the Facebook and LinkedIn advertising pixels transfer data without being held back by gating on the decision.

And LinkedIn is not disclosed. The privacy policy names Google, Meta, Stripe, Customerly. Facebook is present as Meta, Customerly and Google are named. But LinkedIn Ads, which actively sends events in the capture, is not mentioned in the policy by name.

Proven: Google analytics respect the denial. All GA4 and Google Ads requests carry gcs=G100, cookielessly.

Proven: the Facebook pixel sent an event. www.facebook.com/tr POST at +1478 ms, pixel id 241710402319437.

Proven: LinkedIn Ads sent events. px.ads.linkedin.com/wa/ (POST) and /collect at +1692…+1712 ms.

Proven: GTM loads before the in-house CMP. GTM — +668 ms, CookieScript — +1265 ms.

Proven: LinkedIn is not named in the policy. A search of the document finds Google, Meta, Customerly, but not LinkedIn.

Not established: the consent decision. The choice is not recorded in the capture; gcs=G100 indicates a denied state. The Facebook and LinkedIn sends meanwhile took place independently of the Google consent-mode status.

Not proven: the content of the Facebook and LinkedIn events. The bodies of the POST requests in the published file are redacted; the endpoints and the pixel id are readable, not the values.

Observation boundaries

The capture covers a single blog page and records browser behaviour, not server-side processing: what Meta and LinkedIn do with the received data and how CookieScript’s gating is configured on the site’s side is not verified by a browser capture. What is established: the Facebook pixel and the LinkedIn Ads pixel send events; GA/Ads run under denial. The requests to edge.microsoft.com are attributed to capture-tool artefacts. Customerly is attributed to the chat/CRM.

The file is published cleaned of personal data (178 redactions, self-check clean); the sending of Facebook /tr and LinkedIn wa//collect, the gcs=G100 status of GA/Ads and the loading of the in-house CMP can be verified directly against the published file. There are no banner screenshots in the set — the state of the banner UI in this capture is not recorded.

The legal assessment is made by the competent authority — the Lithuanian supervisory authority (VDAI).

Conclusion

The site belongs to the developer of the consent management platform, and its own product is installed on it. This mechanism holds Google analytics correctly — GA4 and Google Ads run under denial (gcs=G100, cookieless). But two advertising pixels bypass this frame: the Facebook pixel sends /tr, and LinkedIn Ads sends wa/ and collect, both actually transferring events and not knowing Google’s consent mode. The GTM container meanwhile loads before the in-house CMP.

Separately: LinkedIn Ads, actively sending events, is not named in the policy — even though Google, Meta and Customerly are. The observation does not qualify intent and does not compare the site with others — it merely records that on the site of the consent-mechanism vendor too, the Facebook and LinkedIn advertising pixels transfer data around that mechanism, and one of the recipients is not disclosed.

Remediation: condition the firing of the Facebook and LinkedIn Ads pixels on actual consent, so that they do not send events before the choice and outside consent mode; gate the GTM container and the advertising pixels through the in-house CMP; name LinkedIn Ads in the policy as a recipient with its purpose stated; preserve the correct consent mode of the Google stack and extend the gating principle to the advertising pixels.

Evidence

How to verify: download the file and compute its checksum — sha256sum file.har (Linux, macOS) or certutil -hashfile file.har SHA256 (Windows); it must match the one shown. The conclusions apply to the scope of this measurement — see the limitations of the method.

Original (audit)
HAR file: global/cookie-script-com-2026-09-13.har
SHA-256: 8466860a8751b0fe12835850e3714fd63e39ccc0ab60671394c0ced67a475731
Re-check snapshot
Awaiting changes
HAR files are stored on EU infrastructure (Proton Drive). SHA-256 is published for integrity verification.