Technical audit · 12.04.2026

emta.ee

Tax and Customs Board — Tax Returns, Payments, Business Registration

The tax authority's website carries the financial data of every citizen and business in the country. On it, two Google Analytics accounts run in parallel — and the owner of the second cannot be identified from public data. The cookie policy is empty and has not been updated in 5 years.

Request timeline

+0.92 sec · before consent
Cloudflare Insights — analytics, USA. Followed at +0.94 sec by GTM: the container fires before the banner, data to the USA.
+1.28 sec · before consent
Google Analytics actually sends data to region1.google-analytics.com. browser-update.org (+1.37 sec) transmits browser and device data. All before any button is clicked.
Consent banner
Three buttons: 'Choose yourself,' 'Allow necessary,' 'Allow all.' There is no 'Reject All' button. The 'Necessary' category is locked, but what it contains is unknown: the cookie policy is empty.

Declared versus actual

✓ Cookie policy: one introductory sentence and a feedback form, no vendors named — declared
+ Google Analytics — two GA4 accounts (G-0K12YCGWL9, G-1CLYN82137), 7 transfers — not declared
+ Google Tag Manager — not declared
+ Cloudflare Insights — not declared
+ browser-update.org — 5 requests, entirely absent — not declared

Transfer timings

+0.92 sec static.cloudflareinsights.com

Cloudflare Insights, data to the USA

+0.94 sec www.googletagmanager.com

GTM — the container fires before the consent banner

+1.28 sec region1.google-analytics.com

GA account G-0K12YCGWL9. 7 transfers per session

+6.58 sec region1.google-analytics.com

A second GA account, G-1CLYN82137 — owner unknown

+1.37 sec browser-update.org

A third-party service, update.min.js, 5 times per session. Absent from the policy

Detected trackers

Indicators of GDPR non-compliance

Context

Maksu- ja Tolliamet is Estonia’s Tax and Customs Board. Through this site, citizens and businesses file tax returns, pay taxes, and register companies. This is the financial data of every taxpayer in the country. HAR: 133 requests, 7 external domains.

An empty policy and a dark pattern

The “Cookies” page was last updated on 05.10.2021 — five years ago. Its content: one introductory sentence and a feedback form. Not a single vendor name, not a single specific cookie, not a single data recipient. The banner offers three buttons — “Choose yourself,” “Allow necessary,” “Allow all” — with no “Reject All” button. Selecting “Choose yourself” locks the “Necessary cookies” category, but what exactly it contains is unknown, because the policy is empty. GTM and browser-update.org, which fire a second before the banner, may well be hidden inside it. This is a dark pattern via opacity: you cannot knowingly decline something you don’t know about.

Cloudflare Insights (+0.92 sec), GTM (+0.94 sec), Google Analytics (+1.28 sec), and browser-update.org (+1.37 sec) all fire before the user has clicked anything. Google Analytics genuinely sends data to region1.google-analytics.com.

Two Google Analytics accounts

Over the session, Google Analytics transmitted data 7 times through two different identifiers: G-0K12YCGWL9 (first transfer at +1.28 sec) and G-1CLYN82137 (first transfer at +6.58 sec). Two separate GA4 accounts run in parallel. Who owns the second one cannot be established from public data, and the cookie policy mentions neither. Separately, there’s browser-update.org: a third-party American service loading update.min.js on every page open (5 times per session) — on the tax authority’s website.

Conclusion

One country, one state — two fundamentally different approaches. eesti.ee knows how to build cleanly: a strict CSP, only Estonian domains, zero external trackers. emta.ee — right down the hall — has installed two Google Analytics accounts, added browser-update.org, and hasn’t updated its cookie policy in 5 years. emta.ee carries the financial data of the entire country, and Google knows who visits the tax authority’s site and when. A standard only exists where there’s a specific person responsible for upholding it; where there isn’t, the system follows the path of least resistance. This is precisely why an annual public audit of government sites isn’t an abstraction: if one existed, emta.ee wouldn’t still look like this five years on.

Evidence

How to verify: download the file and compute its checksum — sha256sum file.har (Linux, macOS) or certutil -hashfile file.har SHA256 (Windows); it must match the one shown. The conclusions apply to the scope of this measurement — see the limitations of the method.

Original (audit)
HAR file: ee/emta-ee-2026-04-12.har
SHA-256: 2964975936b31edc45914c4ebb1c9fb474bbc7fb5027452278db03a5fbbdfd81
Re-check snapshot
Awaiting changes
HAR files are stored on EU infrastructure (Proton Drive). SHA-256 is published for integrity verification.