Denmark's energy system operator — 70 requests, 12 domains. A Cookie Information consent management platform is present, but prior to consent, Google Fonts fires (IP address to Google, USA), along with the Monotype MyFonts counter and the SDK for the GetKarla AI chatbot. The chatbot is declared in the policy; Google Fonts, MyFonts, and the Office CDN are not.
Timeline of the leak
Declared versus actual
Transfer timings
GetKarla SDK. Hosted on Google Cloud/Firebase.
Monotype MyFonts counter. Not named in the policy.
Google Fonts. Google, USA. Not named.
GetKarla chatbot model API. Before the chat is opened.
Detected trackers
- Google Fonts (fonts.googleapis.com, fonts.gstatic.com)
- MyFonts / Monotype (hello.myfonts.net) — font license counter
- GetKarla — AI chatbot (declared, loads prior to consent)
- Cookie Information (policy.app.cookieinformation.com) — CMP
Indicators of GDPR non-compliance
- GDPR Art. 13(1)(e) + Chapter V — disclosure of recipients and transferOn page load, prior to consent, Google Fonts loads (fonts.googleapis.com +1324 ms, fonts.gstatic.com +1902 ms), transmitting the visitor's IP address to Google (USA). The Monotype MyFonts counter also fires (hello.myfonts.net/count/, +290 ms), and Microsoft Office UI resources load (res.cdn.office.net). Neither Google Fonts, MyFonts/Monotype, nor the Office CDN is named in the policy. A Cookie Information consent management platform is present but does not hold back these calls; Set-Cookie across the entire session is zero.
- ePrivacy (Danish Cookiebekendtgørelse) — third-party service prior to consentThe GetKarla AI chatbot is declared in the policy as the provider of the chat feature; however, its SDK loads at +93 ms, and the chatbot model is requested via api.getkarla.ai/v1/models/... at +1732 ms — prior to consent and before the user opens the chat. GetKarla's infrastructure is hosted on Google Cloud/Firebase; the mere loading of the SDK and the API call already transmit the visitor's IP address to the provider prior to consent.
Context
energinet.dk is the website of Energinet, the state operator of Denmark’s electricity and gas transmission systems, a critical infrastructure asset under the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities. The data controller is Energinet. The privacy policy is extensive (approximately 77,000 characters). Capture: 70 requests, 12 domains, recorded in a clean browser.
Direct Recipients of Data (prior to consent)
Google (USA) — the IP address via Google Fonts; Monotype — the MyFonts counter; GetKarla (Google Cloud) — the chatbot SDK and API.
Declared versus Actual
The policy is detailed and, notably, names the chat feature directly: it is provided by GetKarla.ai. This disclosure is correct. However, a number of other services actually in operation are absent from the policy, and some of them fire prior to consent.
On page load, in a state of no consent (Set-Cookie zero, no choice made), the following occurs. At +1324 and +1902 ms, Google Fonts loads (fonts.googleapis.com and fonts.gstatic.com, the Inter font), transmitting the visitor’s IP address to Google (USA). At +290 ms, the Monotype MyFonts font license counter fires (hello.myfonts.net/count/). At +507 ms, Microsoft Office UI resources are pulled in (res.cdn.office.net). Neither Google Fonts, MyFonts/Monotype, nor the Office CDN is named in the policy. A Cookie Information consent management platform is present on the site (loading at +92 ms), but it does not hold back these calls.
Separately, there is the declared GetKarla chatbot: its SDK loads as early as +93 ms, and the chatbot model is requested via api.getkarla.ai at +1732 ms — that is, prior to consent and before the user has opened the chat. GetKarla’s infrastructure is hosted on Google Cloud/Firebase, so even this preliminary loading transmits the visitor’s IP address to the provider. The feature itself is disclosed, but its eager loading prior to consent goes beyond what the user actually initiated. Calls to energikort-prod.kru.so relate to the backend of the interactive map and are functional in nature.
Timing Relative to Consent
The Cookie Information consent management platform loads at +92 ms; however, the chatbot SDK (+93 ms), the MyFonts counter (+290 ms), the Office CDN (+507 ms), Google Fonts (+1324 ms), and the chatbot API (+1732 ms) all fire without waiting for the user’s choice. No consent was given during the session (Set-Cookie is zero).
What Cannot Be Asserted from This Capture
The capture covers the home page. Google and Cloudflare (MyFonts) may use edge nodes within the EU; the conclusion drawn therefore concerns the recipients’ corporate affiliation, not the physical location of the nodes. Calls to kru.so are classified as belonging to the map’s functional backend. The exact composition of data transmitted by the chatbot during its preliminary loading cannot be reconstructed in detail from the lean capture; what is recorded is the fact of the SDK loading and the API request occurring prior to consent. Server-side processing is not visible in a browser-based capture.
Conclusion
Denmark’s energy system operator correctly discloses the GetKarla AI chat feature in its policy, but a number of other services fire prior to consent and are not named in the policy: Google Fonts transmits the IP address to Google (USA), the Monotype MyFonts counter and Microsoft Office UI resources load from external domains, and the chatbot’s own SDK and API initialize before the user opens the chat. A Cookie Information consent management platform is present but does not hold back these calls. The transfer of the IP address to external recipients, including a US-based recipient, prior to consent, together with the non-disclosure of some services, constitutes a violation of the requirements concerning consent, disclosure of recipients, and cross-border transfer. Remedy: host fonts locally and remove the MyFonts counter or make it consent-dependent, defer loading of the chatbot SDK and API until the user opens the chat, hold back external services within Cookie Information until consent is given, and disclose all services actually in use in the policy.
87419632983a968589dd76d977fbe1105fe36f0150d0a87fa32c0e2891195550Where to file: Danish Data Protection Agency (Datatilsynet) — file a complaint online →
To: Danish Data Protection Agency (Datatilsynet) From: [Your name], [contact email] 1. Subject of the complaint I am filing a complaint regarding the processing of my personal data by the website energinet.dk. 2. Circumstances I visited the website energinet.dk and found indications that the processing of my personal data does not comply with the GDPR. The technical analysis published on gdpru.eu on 31 May 2026 (open methodology, reproducible measurements) documents the following indications: 1) On page load, prior to consent, Google Fonts loads (fonts.googleapis.com +1324 ms, fonts.gstatic.com +1902 ms), transmitting the visitor's IP address to Google (USA). The Monotype MyFonts counter also fires (hello.myfonts.net/count/, +290 ms), and Microsoft Office UI resources load (res.cdn.office.net). Neither Google Fonts, MyFonts/Monotype, nor the Office CDN is named in the policy. A Cookie Information consent management platform is present but does not hold back these calls; Set-Cookie across the entire session is zero. 2) The GetKarla AI chatbot is declared in the policy as the provider of the chat feature; however, its SDK loads at +93 ms, and the chatbot model is requested via api.getkarla.ai/v1/models/... at +1732 ms — prior to consent and before the user opens the chat. GetKarla's infrastructure is hosted on Google Cloud/Firebase; the mere loading of the SDK and the API call already transmit the visitor's IP address to the provider prior to consent. Full technical documentation is published at: https://gdpru.eu/en/audits/dk-energinet-dk/ 3. Provisions violated GDPR Art. 13(1)(e) + Chapter V — disclosure of recipients and transfer; ePrivacy (Danish Cookiebekendtgørelse) — third-party service prior to consent 4. Request I request that you investigate the violations described and apply the measures provided for in Article 58(2) GDPR. 5. Attachments The full evidence base — the HAR file, its SHA-256 checksum and the quotation from the site's privacy policy documenting the stated contradiction — is published and verifiable at the link in point 2 above. [Date] [Signature / name]