kmk.org
Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the German Länder. 71 requests, 1 domain. TYPO3, nginx. Karla Variable Font and Font Awesome served locally. Klaro as the CMP — undeclared. Matomo on the proprietary server — declared, not active in the HAR. The policy cites the outdated DDG instead of TDDDG. Set-Cookie — zero.
Timeline of the leak
Declared versus actual
Indicators of GDPR non-compliance
- GDPR Art. 13(1)(e)Klaro — an open-source CMP platform (klaro.min.js, klaroConfig.js, klaroObserver.js) — is not mentioned in the privacy policy. The policy contains no section on the consent management tool and relies on outdated legal references: it cites DDG (Digitale-Dienste-Gesetz) instead of TDDDG (Telekommunikation-Digitale-Dienste-Datenschutz-Gesetz), which replaced TTDSG in May 2023.
Context
KMK (Kultusministerkonferenz) is the standing conference of the education and cultural affairs ministers of Germany’s 16 Länder. It coordinates education policy at the federal level. Secretariat: Berlin. TYPO3, nginx, Vite. HAR: 71 requests, 1 domain.
Klaro — an open-source CMP, local, undeclared
The three Klaro files (klaro.min.js, klaroConfig.js, klaroObserver.js) load from TYPO3’s local _assets/ directory. Klaro is an open-source consent-management library (MIT license) that requires no external server requests and transmits no data to third parties. There is not a single request to external Klaro servers in the HAR — all CMP logic runs client-side. The privacy policy makes no mention of Klaro, the consent-management mechanism, or the consent cookies used.
Policy: outdated legal references
The privacy policy cites DDG (Digitale-Dienste-Gesetz) as the legal basis for data processing. DDG is Germany’s implementation of the EU Digital Services Act, which regulates large platforms. Cookies on websites fall under TDDDG (Telekommunikation-Digitale-Dienste-Datenschutz-Gesetz), which replaced TTDSG in May 2023. Matomo is described with a legal basis of “berechtigte Interessen” (legitimate interest), with no reference to TDDDG.
Karla Variable Font — local
KMK uses the Karla Variable Font in TTF format — a variable font covering a continuous weight range in a single file. Font Awesome Regular — woff2, local. No Google Fonts, no Adobe Fonts.
Matomo — declared, not active in the HAR
The policy describes Matomo on KMK’s own server, with IP anonymization and opt-out via cookie. There are no requests to a Matomo server in the homepage HAR — the analytics tool was not activated on first visit.
Conclusion
www.kmk.org does not transmit visitor data to third parties. One domain, local resources, local Klaro as the CMP. The one violation: Klaro is not declared in the privacy policy, which also contains outdated legal references to DDG instead of TDDDG.
d1f5445deba0bc432dbe9c4d37d26fe719ed13a69e9a3eff22971a2d28526763Where to file: Federal Commissioner for Data Protection (BfDI) — file a complaint online →
To: Federal Commissioner for Data Protection (BfDI) From: [Your name], [contact email] 1. Subject of the complaint I am filing a complaint regarding the processing of my personal data by the website kmk.org. 2. Circumstances I visited the website kmk.org and found indications that the processing of my personal data does not comply with the GDPR. The technical analysis published on gdpru.eu on 29 May 2026 (open methodology, reproducible measurements) documents the following indications: 1) Klaro — an open-source CMP platform (klaro.min.js, klaroConfig.js, klaroObserver.js) — is not mentioned in the privacy policy. The policy contains no section on the consent management tool and relies on outdated legal references: it cites DDG (Digitale-Dienste-Gesetz) instead of TDDDG (Telekommunikation-Digitale-Dienste-Datenschutz-Gesetz), which replaced TTDSG in May 2023. Full technical documentation is published at: https://gdpru.eu/en/audits/de-kmk-org/ 3. Provisions violated GDPR Art. 13(1)(e) 4. Request I request that you investigate the violations described and apply the measures provided for in Article 58(2) GDPR. 5. Attachments The full evidence base — the HAR file, its SHA-256 checksum and the quotation from the site's privacy policy documenting the stated contradiction — is published and verifiable at the link in point 2 above. [Date] [Signature / name]