Technical audit · 2026-05-26

parlament.gv.at

Austrian Parliament

Austrian Parliament — 84 requests, 1 domain. Self-hosted Matomo loads at 91 ms and pings at 241 ms. The policy states plainly: consent required. There is none.

Timeline of the leak

+91 ms · Matomo scripts
pdpiwik.js and piwik/piwik.js load from www.parlament.gv.at alongside the CSS. There is no consent banner.
+241 ms · tracking ping
piwik.php sends a POST with action_name=Startseite and idsite=1. Visit data is recorded before any user choice.
Session total
84 requests, 1 domain. Zero external services. Matomo is the only tracker, self-hosted.

Declared versus actual

Matomo — declared in the policy, which explicitly states 'Mit Ihrer Einwilligung', appears in the HAR before consent — declared

Transfer timings

+91 ms www.parlament.gv.at/piwik/piwik.js

The Matomo script loads without consent.

+241 ms www.parlament.gv.at/piwik/piwik.php

Tracking ping: action_name=Startseite, idsite=1. Before consent.

Detected trackers

Indicators of GDPR non-compliance

Context

Österreichisches Parlament is Austria’s legislative body, comprising the Nationalrat and the Bundesrat. The Parlamentsdirektion is its administrative apparatus. HAR: 84 requests, 1 domain.

The parliament’s privacy policy is carefully written: a dedicated “Webanalyse-Cookie” section states explicitly that Matomo runs only with the user’s consent, that the IP address is anonymized, and that data is stored on Parlamentsdirektion servers. Not a word about external recipients.

The HAR shows something different: pdpiwik.js loads at +91 ms, piwik.js follows, and the tracking ping goes out at +241 ms. There is no consent banner in the session. The gap between what is declared and what is implemented is precise and documented.

Matomo is deployed entirely on the parliament’s own infrastructure — /piwik/ on the same domain. Data is not sent to third parties, and the IP address is anonymized. Architecturally, this is correct. But firing before consent, while explicitly declaring the opposite, makes this a violation — one the parliament itself documented in its own policy.

Conclusion

84 requests, 1 domain, zero external dependencies. Self-hosted Matomo is a good solution. But the Austrian Parliament violates its own privacy policy: the tracker fires without the consent the policy calls a mandatory condition.

Evidence
Original (audit)
HAR file: at/parlament-gv-at-2026-05-26.har
SHA-256: 5b6789973887b79e26c018ffff42a43b509c752e56d3ba5b435fce6328217bd8
Re-check snapshot
Awaiting changes
HAR files are stored on EU infrastructure (Proton Drive). SHA-256 is published for integrity verification.
IMPORTANT: before filing a complaint with the regulator, first contact the company directly and give it 30 days to respond. Without this step the regulator may reject the complaint. Details and a template letter to the company are in the Methodology.
Ready-to-send complaint letter

Where to file: Datenschutzbehörde (DSB)file a complaint online →

To: Datenschutzbehörde (DSB)
From: [Your name], [contact email]

1. Subject of the complaint
I am filing a complaint regarding the processing of my personal data by the website parlament.gv.at.

2. Circumstances
I visited the website parlament.gv.at and found indications that the processing of my personal data does not comply with the GDPR. The technical analysis published on gdpru.eu on 26 May 2026 (open methodology, reproducible measurements) documents the following indications:

1) Matomo (Piwik) fires 91 ms after the page loads and sends a tracking ping at +241 ms. The privacy policy states explicitly: "Mit Ihrer Einwilligung setzt die Parlamentswebseite ein Cookie von Matomo" — i.e., only with consent. There is no consent, yet the tracker runs.

Full technical documentation is published at: https://gdpru.eu/en/audits/at-parlament-gv-at/

3. Provisions violated
GDPR Art. 6(1)(a), TKG § 165

4. Request
I request that you investigate the violations described and apply the measures provided for in Article 58(2) GDPR.

5. Attachments
The full evidence base — the HAR file, its SHA-256 checksum and the quotation from the site's privacy policy documenting the stated contradiction — is published and verifiable at the link in point 2 above.

[Date]                                    [Signature / name]