App analysis · 12.10.2026

føtex plus

dk.dsg.foetex · version 3.0.8

12SDKs found
9companies
7companies outside the EEA
13sensitive permissions

In short

SDKs found: 12. Companies: 9, of which outside the EEA — 7. Sensitive permissions: 13 — all code inside the app, including embedded SDKs, can use them.

What is inside — embedded SDKs

  • Firebase Cloud Messaging — Google LLC, United States outside EEA push notifications
  • Firebase Crashlytics — Google LLC, United States outside EEA crash reporting
  • Google Firebase Analytics — Google LLC, United States outside EEA analytics
  • ironSource — Unity Technologies, Israel outside EEA advertising
  • Unity Ads — Unity Technologies, United States outside EEA advertising
  • Adjust — Adjust GmbH, Germany EEA атрибуция установок
  • AppLovin — AppLovin Corp., United States outside EEA advertising
  • AppsFlyer — AppsFlyer Ltd, Israel outside EEA атрибуция установок
  • Chartboost — Chartboost, United States outside EEA advertising
  • Datadog RUM — Datadog Inc., United States outside EEA performance monitoring
  • Singular — Singular Labs, United States outside EEA атрибуция установок
  • Usercentrics — Usercentrics GmbH, Germany EEA consent platform

Sensitive permissions (13)

  • approximate location — android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
  • precise location — android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • camera — android.permission.CAMERA
  • files on the device — android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • write files on the device — android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • scan for nearby Bluetooth devices — android.permission.BLUETOOTH_SCAN
  • phone data (carrier, call state) — android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • biometrics (fingerprint, face) — android.permission.USE_BIOMETRIC
  • fingerprint — android.permission.USE_FINGERPRINT
  • advertising ID (Privacy Sandbox) — android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_AD_ID
  • ad attribution (Privacy Sandbox) — android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_ATTRIBUTION
  • advertising ID — com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID
  • draw over other apps — android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
All manifest permissions (30)
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_AD_ID
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_ATTRIBUTION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_SCAN
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.DOWNLOAD_WITHOUT_NOTIFICATION
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
  • android.permission.USE_BIOMETRIC
  • android.permission.USE_FINGERPRINT
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID
  • com.google.android.providers.gsf.permission.READ_GSERVICES
  • dk.dsg.foetex.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION

Limits of the analysis

The analysis shows code inside the app file, not data transfers: an SDK being present means a transfer is possible, not that it happens. The country is where the company owning the SDK is registered, not where its servers are. Some code may have been renamed at build time, so the SDK list is a lower bound.

The legal assessment is made by the competent supervisory authority.

Evidence

File: dk.dsg.foetex.apk (163.6 MB)
Package: dk.dsg.foetex · version 3.0.8 (code 386032)
Android: minimum API 24, target API 36
File SHA-256: b690cac3f2024f77d4485fe66ceb0802e4162b0f18cc86288cd4241f556592f3
Developer signature (SHA-256): 29e99ac5bafaf4f136a7883051c87950f05f58397a92256bf28428648a42640d
Signed by: Dansk Supermarked (DK) · EEA · key since 2016-08-02
File source: APKPure (через apkeep)

The same file (same SHA-256) with the same library version gives the same result — check it on the APK check page. Licence CC BY 4.0, source — gdpru.eu; report errors to contact@gdpru.eu.

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