App analysis · 19.10.2026
Bluetooth LE Spam
de.simon.dankelmann.bluetoothlespam · version 1.0.9
In short
SDKs found: 0. Companies: 0, of which outside the EEA — 0. Sensitive permissions: 4 — all code inside the app, including embedded SDKs, can use them.
Sensitive permissions (4)
- background location —
android.permission.ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION - approximate location —
android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION - precise location —
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION - scan for nearby Bluetooth devices —
android.permission.BLUETOOTH_SCAN
All manifest permissions (13)
android.permission.ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATIONandroid.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATIONandroid.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATIONandroid.permission.BLUETOOTHandroid.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMINandroid.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADVERTISEandroid.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECTandroid.permission.BLUETOOTH_SCANandroid.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICEandroid.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_LOCATIONandroid.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_SPECIAL_USEandroid.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONSde.simon.dankelmann.bluetoothlespam.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION
Limits of the analysis
The analysis shows code inside the app file, not data transfers: an SDK being present means a transfer is possible, not that it happens. The country is where the company owning the SDK is registered, not where its servers are. Some code may have been renamed at build time, so the SDK list is a lower bound.
The legal assessment is made by the competent supervisory authority.
Evidence
de.simon.dankelmann.bluetoothlespam · version 1.0.9 (code 3)4867f7c16ee86c68c2c5c3cd37888dfe3cb35ecc2ab7482b9775fd568a307f2a7fcdb5242cd0e02eaa141ce2f4cb191a3bde2aed68da8b6bec41f5360a18e23213c27d15ac2eThe same file (same SHA-256) with the same library version gives the same result — check it on the APK check page. Licence CC BY 4.0, source — gdpru.eu; report errors to contact@gdpru.eu.